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 Understanding consumers’ brand choice behavior is critical in formulating marketing 
strategies. One of the most significant factors of consumer brand choice behavior is state 
dependence whereby the consumer's past choices affect its current choice behavior.  
 
There are two types of state dependence, namely inertia and variety-seeking. When a 
consumer exhibits inertia (variety-seeking), a purchase of a brand increases (decreases) the 
probability of repurchasing the same brand on the next purchasing occasion. In addition to 
inertia and variety-seeking, Bawa (1990) proposed another type of state dependence which he 
calls ``hybrid behavior" whereby a consumer exhibits inertial behavior at first but becomes 
variety-seeking after a certain period of time. Despite the unique attempt, his specification is 
not without limitations. Besides he analyzed the only two-brand case, the model did not 
incorporate the effects of marketing variables and heterogeneity across consumers, which had 
been empirically found to affect consumers brand choice behavior significantly.  
 
However, as Bawa (1990) attempted, a variety-seeking propensity may emerge in the course 
of repeated consumptions of the same brand and worth more detailed research. Therefore in 
Chapter 2, we developed a comprehensive model which could accommodate inertia and 
variety-seeking as well as hybrid behavior incorporating consumers’ heterogeneous 
preferences to brands and sensitivities to marketing variables. Specifically, we developed a 
model including the brand loyalty variable suggested by Guadagni and Little (1983) and the 
variable called run, the number of consecutive purchases of the same brand defined in Bawa 
(1990), to express the hybrid behavior. We then used the latent class model to estimate the 
parameters of the model using ketchup purchasing data in U.S. 
 
 As our empirical analysis found that the proposed model fitted the data best compared to the 
competing models with a fair number of significant variables. The hybrid behavior was found 
to be minimal. However, this study shed a light on the possible presence of the hybrid 
behavior and there are plenty of marketing insights generated from this model. 
 
In analyzing a consumer good market, one must account for the fact that marketing activities 
of a firm would trigger the reactions from the other players in the market. The approach called 
a structural market equilibrium model is sometimes employed to model such an interaction 
among manufacturers and retailers as well as among manufacturers. This approach describes 
the interaction of manufacturers, retailers, and consumers by imposing their optimizing 
behavioral assumptions; manufacturers and retailer are assumed to maximize their own profits 
and consumers are assumed to maximize their utilities.  
 
A structural market equilibrium model allows the variety of competitive structure of the 
market via different combinations of inter-firms interactions. Such an interaction consists of 
two main factors of the market structure, namely horizontal strategic interactions among 
manufacturers (Bertrand competition or tacit collusion)  and vertical strategic interaction 
among manufacturers and retailers (manufacturer Stackelberg or vertical Nash). 
 
What has been missing in the literature is the retailer Stackelberg formulation whereby the 
retailer has control over pricing relative to manufacturers. Given the purported power shift 
from manufacturers to a retailer, we feel that this game has to be considered along with 
manufacturer Stackelberg and vertical Nash game. Therefore in this research, we extended 
Che et al. (2007) by mathematically formulating retailer Stackelberg. Empirically, we 
 analyzed Japanese yogurt market to investigate whether manufacturers' effort to develop 
special featured brands was still rewarding in terms of profit margins.  
 
We found that the brands with the differentiating feature (i.e., enhancing the health effect of 
yogurt by newly found bacillus) enabled the manufacturer to command larger margins than 
the other brands, showing that the manufacturer's effort in this direction could be interpreted 
as rewarding. However, the power to charge larger margins did not spill over to the other 
brands of the manufacturer. We also find that the retailer earns the same amount of margins as 
manufacturers.  
 
Formulating a new game theoretic framework to describe this phenomenon and testing it with 
the real data, albeit a small one, would be of great interest to researchers in the field as well as 
of practical importance to those working for innovative manufacturers facing similar 
circumstances. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of a retailer Stackelberg 
formulation in the context of the discrete choice model. Because of this contribution, this 
chapter was published in a refereed journal named Cogent Economics and Finance as Kamai 
and Kanazawa (2016). This study is hence unique in that it successfully portrays the 
symmetrical relationship between manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg games, 
whereby the vertical Nash game is located in the midpoint of those games. 
 
Some researchers such as Misra and Mohanty (2008) and Draganska et al. (2010) extend the 
structural equation model studied in Chapter 3 by incorporating Nash bargaining game into 
the framework. Specifically, they formulate wholesale prices as the outcome of the bargaining 
in each manufacturer-retailer pair via Nash bargaining game. This approach contrasts with 
 previous models in that it enables researchers to calibrate relative bargaining power between 
each manufacturer-retailer pair, rather than overall power structure in the market. 
 
While these previous research successfully portrays the behavior of market players to a 
certain extent, it formulates the retailer as a passively reacting entity which accepts whatever 
manufacturers offer. More importantly, it assumes that the retail prices are fixed. This might 
be unrealistic assumption given that manufacturers could raise wholesale prices without 
decreasing its market shares if the retail price does not change with wholesale prices. 
 
To relax the fixed retail price assumption, we incorporated the retailer Stackelberg 
formulation into the framework in Chapter 4. In this formulation, the retailer first determines 
its margins and manufacturers determine wholesale prices accounting for the retail prices. 
This formulation is consistent with the aforementioned power increase of retailers, as it is 
possible that some of the retailers bargain aggressively with manufacturers over wholesale 
prices and thus enjoy a larger profit than the previous approach could have suggested.  
 
Empirically, we accommodated the retailer Stackelberg game in the Nash bargaining model 
framework and tested that formulation using Japanese canned tuna data. We also employed 
the previous approach to compare the results. 
 
Our estimation results showed that the Nash bargaining model with retailer Stackelberg 
formulation fitted our data better compared to the previous approach, suggesting that the 
retailer Stackelberg could be the real relationship among manufacturers and retailers in Japan. 
In terms of power among a retailer and manufacturers, the retailer power is estimated to be 
much stronger when the Nash bargaining model with retailer Stackelberg formulation is 
 employed. Interestingly, we also found that some manufacturers are actually better off when a 
retailer has power implying that the presence of the strong retailer may reduce the double 
marginalization problem, which is consistent with the theory of Duke et al. (2006). Though 
the result is limited to a specific product category in a specific market, we believe that our 
proposed model has a broader significance to the literature as well as to the practitioner. 
